It's been four months (possibly five) since I've had anything worth writing on this blog — which isn't really true, but it has a sort of emotional honesty to it, and that's something I'm working on now. This is an aspiration massively hindered by my poor understanding of the terms (hence the previous sentence's assertion that "I haven't had anything to say" is an emotionally, if not factually, true statement).
I've been writing. I've been journalling. I've even been Face-booking, which can be a sort of concentrated perversion of the blogging enterprise, save for the fact that you're just as likely (if not more so) to be interpreted as clever/terse as (than) sincere/thoughtful in their little blue-and-white boxes.
This isn't meant to discount the tireless efforts of my blog's readership to undermine my attempts at sincerity (this is the internet, and Americans have an ugly/wonderful need to be clever/awful — even when they're not). If anything, I've returned to this arena (forum? podium? practice?) because I'm worried Facebook, or text-messaging (or theoretically twittering, which I haven't done, but that's not important), is making me glib.
I find myself condensing ideas, which is an urge I sort of hate.
For instance, a while ago, on my wall, I updated my status with the following missive:
I've had an epiphany.
I don't need to fabricate moral justifications to dislike people. There's nothing stopping me from despising morally upright human-beings.
This changes everything.
Obviously (painfully so), I was inviting a discussion which I suspect I knew would not be forthcoming, and rightfully so... Facebook would be a terrible place to develop ideas on the internet, second maybe to the comments section of a poorly constructed political satire video on Youtube.
Ignoring my desperate need to fabricate instances of unrequited attention-seeking behavior, I meant some part of this statement sincerely, and posting it on Facebook strikes me as dishonest ... or maybe withholding?
At the risk of alienating my readers (or maybe patronizing them), I'd like to give this thought some space in which to develop.
Disperated (made up word, don't worry) as I am, both temporally and spatially, from this thought's conception, I can't recall if it was a petty reactionary thought (eg: someone was off-putting at Starbucks, so I've decided I must hate him) or the result of a long, deliberate (tedious) process of deduction — okay, it must have been the first.
I imagine it happening like this; some fine, upstanding young-man at Starbucks (with a well-groomed beard and a cultivated easy-going attitude) stands, or rather leans, at the counter, recounting his weekend plans (which must be very exciting) as an attractive barista feigns/expresses interest by pausing between the muscle-memorized movements to smile or prod the young-man into further elaboration as to his weekend's grand design (which, as it turned out, was not very exciting). As this happens, I'm standing beside the display case of fatty foods, not wanting to put my hands on the glass or in my pockets (because someone else was doing that — not my pockets, obviously), thinking to myself I hate this man, he's awful, and I'm not sure why or something to that effect.
Sipping my coffee (that's an ugly way to start a sentence), I thought to myself (even worse) there must be some reason I can't stand this man; he must have done something to justify my disinclination towards him. After dismissing petty jealousy (perhaps too hastily), I tried to convince myself that this young-man's cock-sure attitude and need to distract the barista with his inane (but by no means vile) droning was nothing less than a moral failing of massive proportions.
This conclusion would have been idiotic.
It occurred to me (or might have, had this actually been the impetus for my line of thought, which it very-well could have) that arguing for a moral imperative against polite chatter would be, in every way, stupid. Unfortunately, despite my acceptance that this young-man had done nothing wrong (or at least nothing particularly offensive), I still disliked him immensely.
And, this wouldn't have been a novel experience, and generally, I'd have decided my irrational irritation was unwarranted, or that what I'd been annoyed by was a frustrating situation, and (because I'm a petulant child) I'm unable to move past that sort of thing without assigning blame, and given that I'm not a crazy person, the only option seemingly left to me would be to accept that, as no one could be blamed, I must not allow myself to be upset.
But, something about that wouldn't feel right, and that something was the fact that the young-man who'd done nothing morally wrong was responsible for my having to wait for my coffee and that while I didn't blame him, I did not care for him as a person.
In a sense, this notion of divorcing moral assessment from interpersonal relationships seems like a horrible idea, as it would seem to justify the worst sort of prejudice and bigotry (eg: I know gay people aren't doing anything wrong, but I still think they're creepy), but in another sense, I feel it may be a useful insight, in so far as requiring a moral justification for antipathy must, in some sense, be it's own sort of prejudice (leading the witness, as it were).
It bothers me that people are so apt to interpret/intuit an explanation for their behavior, or worse still, a smug "universal" lesson from their subjective experiences (eg: if it seems too good to be true, it probably is; beer before liquor, never been sicker; god answers prayer), partially because people are terrible at this, and being terrible at this allows them to construct moronic beliefs (eg: buy gold; different alcohol effects you differently; genital mutilation).
Accepting that there are people whom I will dislike for reasons that have nothing to do with their moral worth, I may be able to avoid conceptualizing affection as a reward for being good (take that society), learn to forgive those who've rejected my romantic intentions (ie: their rejection doesn't speak to my worth), and most importantly, allow me to experience my feelings (as I believe they're called) without feeling the need to either pervert my conception of morality (eg: it's immoral to waste a barista's time with polite nonsense) or diminish my experience (eg: my annoyance is unjustified, thus I will no longer feel annoyed).
It's possible, this will allow me to become more human. It's also possible that this will allow me to become an unmitigated sadist. Only time will tell.
I find it interesting that you think in terms of "moral worth." Is this a universal morality, with universal good and universal bad? Or just a subjective morality, a sort of "this brings me pleasure right now"?
ReplyDeleteIn discussions I've had with Nick (who is both highly philosophical, ruthlessly logical, and incontrovertibly pragmatic), he says that the only logical course of action is hedonism. A sort of social morality can arise from that, since promoting altruistic actions and general rules helps maintain a lifestyle that doesn't result in the hedonist's discomfort or murder.
After all, there's no way of knowing that anyone outside of yourself is real - they could all just be philosophical zombies (wikipedia it, seriously) or hallucinations, so the idea of some universal right and wrong begin to lose importance and meaning. Promoting one's own pleasure becomes the main goal. If attempting to make those around you happy makes you happy, then great - selfishness leads to unselfish actions which then promote selfish pleasure at no one's expense.
I don't really know where I'm going with all of this.
Mostly I want to know more about what you consider morality.
Something not quite as hedonistic as you make subjective morality sound, but not so fascistic as to be called universal. I will have to admit to a subjective morality (limited as I am), but based on some vaguely objective sounding assertions (eg: compassion is better than cruelty, sincerity is a courageous venture, empathy is nice, self-interest shouldn't come at the expense of others when that sort of thing can be avoided, ??? ).
ReplyDeleteIt's not a particularly solid theory.
That said, I find your (not necessarily your's, but the one you seem to present) theory troubling, not in the sense that self-interest can't motivate one to be moral (I believe it does), but because the basis for that theory being an agnosticism as to the reality of others existence (ie: significance) makes me sad/nauseous/hyperbolic.
This could have something to do with my biased understanding of morality being based so much on recognizing the legitimacy of other human-beings, ie: "do not do unto others what you would find reprehensible, were it done upon you", though, even this has its limitations (eg: were I more of a pervert, I might enjoy strangers rubbing against me on the train, and as such, I should feel free to do unto others what is essentially criminal sexual assault).
I think hedonism as moral incentive suffers a similar failing though, in that were I a brilliant sadist, I could easily cultivate abusive, domineering relationships without much fear of social reprisal. Or I could punch drifters and prostitutes, as either they don't exist, or if they do, they're in no position to accuse me, a fine, upstanding sociopath.
All things considered (which is a stupid phrase), I suspect my theory (and the one you present) depend on a vague notion of empathy, so that one is pained by the idea of harming others and tries, when one can, to avoid that.
As to how I can denounce the moral worth of others, short answer is I probably can't, but the long answer is there are people who are more petty, selfish, and cruel than others, and I imagine you've met some of them.
I'm not sure what to think about these zombies.
ReplyDeleteI find some philosophy tedious.
Nick is more of a logical purist than I am. He tends to say that, sure, a sadistic hedonist would not be great to have around, but then the hedonism of people who like being alive and comfortable would then work to limit the sadist's pleasure-seeking, because it actively detracts from everyone else's pleasure.
ReplyDeleteI, on the other hand, operate on a principle of empathy, and on the premise that life is rare enough in the universe that it's worth promoting. If I can make the lives of the people directly around me a bit easier, that's a job well done and I derive worth and meaning from that. That's not morality, though - that's just me wanting everyone to not be assholes to each other in the interest of maybe attempting to make sure humanity doesn't kill itself off right when we're barely out of the monkey.
My proxy argument with Nick's perceived ideals would force me to note that he's making assumptions (or they're being made on his behalf) that, if his contention arises from the position that anyone but him is assumed to be a zombie, render the question moot (unless he's a sadist or someone else's zombie).
ReplyDeleteMore over, if we can divorce his theory from its purported basis (as assuming others will seek pleasure assumes they can experience pleasure), which I think we can, because zombie solipsism is a silly idea (I apologize if this is a cherished belief), then I have to wonder why this theory ends at restraining the sadist. Why not execute pseudo-celebrities and those religious groups who protest everything? People could conceivably be happier without them. And while there are compelling reasons not to murder people within this framework (Americans would rather be a culture which does not murder celebrities and nut-jobs), posing the question as an aesthetic choice doesn't strike me as particularly moral or logical. What is the hedonistically logical position on abortion or gay marriage?
Also, I like the implication of your premise that, were we to discover loads of new inhabited galaxies, we could just start hitting people with our cars, because fuck 'em.
And somehow, I find myself in the peculiar position of arguing with you about your choosing not to call what you describe morality. I have a similar objection to Kant, who created a system of moral philosophy which discounts nearly every conceivable action from being considered moral (in that the selfish pleasure gained from doing good negates the altruism of the act). I believe this is a useless conception of morality, much in the same way that, if we can't call "wanting to make people's lives easier and not being assholes" morality, then morality ceases to become a useful term.